Every call. Every date.
Every outcome.

PHM identified Day 28 of the Hormuz closure as the cascade threshold — the point at which shipping network disruption stops compounding linearly. Published 29 March 2026, three days before the threshold date. Stated specifically: "A 56-day disruption produces 2.5× the impact of a 28-day disruption. After day 28, every additional day is more disruptive than the day before." The consequence: preparation windows identified in the entry would cost 2–3× more to execute after 30 March than before.

PHM published on 29 March that the correct framing of the Hormuz closure was not a complete blockade but a controlled access regime — specifically the Pakistan corridor allowing ~20 vessels per day under yuan-denominated toll conditions, with Western-flagged vessels excluded. This was published when most commentary was framing the situation as a total closure. The implication identified: the vessel count through the Pakistan corridor was the real-time indicator of Iranian intent, more reliable than diplomatic statements.

In the 30 March threshold update, PHM identified a second cascade chain beyond the primary energy/logistics signal — the helium supply disruption from Ras Laffan. Specific call: Qatar supplies 30% of global helium as an LNG byproduct. QatarEnergy declared force majeure 2 March. ~200 helium containers stranded in Qatar, each holding 35–48 days of supply before venting. South Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese semiconductor fabs are the largest consumers. PHM called this as a minimum 3-month disruption even under a ceasefire scenario.

PHM's Chemicals × CFO entry published 1 April identified TTF at €54/MWh — 20% below the €65 curtailment threshold for most European naphtha crackers. The call: Atlantic basin sourcing window open, capacity being allocated to first movers. The consequence: organisations that had not begun the curtailment model or feedstock sourcing audit would face 2–3× higher preparation costs within weeks. Published same day as TTF confirmation at €54.

PHM identified the 2027 fertiliser contract window as open on 2 April 2026, with urea at $750/ton (+56% from $482 pre-war). Gulf states supply 30% of global urea. China closed its export valve mid-March. The European relief source from 2021–22 is simultaneously unavailable. Call: acting in Q2 2026 before the spring auction premium activates will produce materially lower costs than acting in Q3. Historical precedent documented: organisations that locked Q3 2021 contracts paid 3× less than those that waited until Q1 2022. Some could not source at any price.

PHM's Maritime × COO entry identified the fertiliser supply shock as a separate cascade from the primary energy signal. Urea at $750/ton (+56% from pre-war $482). Gulf states = 30% of global urea supply. Iran's tolling system excludes Western-flagged vessels from the supply chain entirely. Call: organisations that lock 2027 planting season contracts in Q2 2026 will pay materially less than those that wait for confirmation. Historical precedent documented: 2022 contracts locked in Q3 2021 cost 3× less than those locked in Q1 2022.

PHM's Technology × COO/CPO entry published 2 April identified that qualification timelines for rare earth magnets (12–18 months), specialty semiconductors (18–36 months) and advanced materials (36+ months) mean that organisations starting in mid-2026 face a hard 2028 completion date minimum. Call: alternative supplier capacity is being allocated to first movers now. The cost differential between acting in Q2 2026 vs Q3 2026 is real and growing. Historical precedent: 2019 Huawei entity list — pre-qualified organisations transitioned in 6–12 weeks; unqualified organisations spent 12–18 months at 30–80% premium.

PHM published on 2 April — as Brent fell from $112 to $101 on Trump's "objectives nearing completion" signal — that the falling price was not evidence of a clean resolution. Specific call: Iran has added a new demand for US recognition of sovereign control over Hormuz, seeking to convert the blockade into a permanent $600–800M/month tolling regime. Iran's parliament was drafting formal legislation. The consequence identified: organisations that interpret falling Brent as "problem solved" and unwind alternative sourcing, Cape routing approvals or hedges are making a documented strategic error. The structural shift persists regardless of ceasefire.